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A B S T R A C T
In General Comment No. 1, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities calls for ‘the best
interpretation of will and preferences’ to replace best interests determinations in decision-making law, but it has
given little guidance on the content of this new standard. As a result, ‘best interpretation’ is sometimes treated as
synonymous with ‘true interpretation’. On this reading, ‘the best interpretation of will and preferences’ is just
whatever interpretation most accurately represents the interpreted person's will and preferences.
This article shows that the conﬂation of the word ‘best’ with the word ‘true’ must be avoided. Interpretative
processes contribute to changes in the interpreted person, including changes in their will and preferences. There
are both supportive and abusive forms of these contributions, but conﬂating ‘best interpretation’ with ‘true
interpretation’ removes both from view. An alternative reading of ‘best interpretation’ should therefore be
preferred: one that requires the process of interpretation to be responsive to both truth and the detailed sub-
stantive rights found in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
1. Introduction
Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (‘the UNCRPD') guarantees people with disabilities ‘equal
recognition before the law’.1 It also establishes a Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Article 34). State Parties make
regular reports to this Committee about their compliance with their
Convention obligations (Article 35), and it makes ‘suggestions and
general recommendations' in response (Article 36). In these responses,
the Committee has frequently observed that people with mental dis-
abilities are still subject to discriminatory guardianship regimes that
remove or impair their ability to exercise legal rights (UN Committee on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2011).2 Beyond that, it has ob-
served such a ‘general misunderstanding’ of Article 12 that it ‘has found
it imperative to provide further guidance’ (UN Committee on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, 2014: para. 3) in the form of General
Comment No. 1 (‘GC1’). This guidance, however, is necessarily written
at a high level of generality, so it neither settles all of the controversies
that existed during the Convention's drafting process (Dhanda, 2007)
nor fully develops all of the claims that it makes about the ‘normative
content of Article 12’ (UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, 2014: part II).
This article addresses one claim made in GC1: the statement that the
‘best interpretation of will and preferences’ must replace ‘best interests’
decisions for adults (para. 21). This claim is controversial. Many states
use variations on best interests systems, and some authors believe that
it is possible to modify such systems to make them UNCRPD-compliant
(Martin et al., 2014); but it can seem that the Comment entirely rules
out this approach. The idea of a simple either/or choice here, however,
can distract from the level of complexity that exists on both sides of the
issue. On one hand, the operation of best interests systems is more
complex than either statutory language or judicial statements usually
imply (Skowron, 2018). On the other hand, without a relatively precise
account of what ‘the best interpretation of will and preferences’ re-
quires, any comparison between it and ‘best interests’ is premature. This
article addresses the latter point. It is a step towards developing a clear
account of best interpretation.
It is especially important to clarify what ‘best interpretation’ re-
quires because the phrase is ambiguous. The ‘best interpretation’ of a
person's will and preferences could refer to two diﬀerent things. It
might refer to the best statement of a person's will and preferences, the
outcome of a process of interpretation; but it might also refer to the best
method of interpreting a person, the process of interpretation itself.
When it comes to understanding ‘best interpretation’, it is essential to
address this ambiguity. To evaluate any set of practices against a
standard, it is necessary to ﬁrst know where the standard applies. State
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1 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3, Article 12.
2 These observations are not legally binding, but States that disagree must ‘engage …and present good counter-arguments’ (Martin et al. 2016, p. 56).
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Parties must know what to measure if they are to assess their com-
pliance with GC1.
This article shows that there is an overriding reason to read the
Comment as demanding a particular process of interpretation, not as
demanding a particular type of outcome: outcome measures pay in-
suﬃcient attention to the ways that people are changed and preferences
are brought into existence by acts of interpretation. This matters for two
reasons. First, some interpretative processes that change a person's
preferences, such as oﬀering them new options, may be acceptable, but
others, such as ones that undermine their conﬁdence, will not be; and it
is important to be able distinguish between the two. Second, the way
that a person's preferences change during the process of being inter-
preted can be an expression of their agency, but outcome measures
subtly misattribute this agency to the interpreter.
Section two shows that although there is some evidence that the
Committee intended ‘best interpretation’ to apply primarily to the
process of interpretation, this is ambiguous. It also, however, makes a
further important point. ‘Best interpretation’ in the Comment is some-
times read as a special procedure only to be used when it is not ‘prac-
ticable to determine the will and preferences of an individual’ (para.
21), but the section shows that GC1 instead calls for best interpretation
even when it is not ‘practicable to determine the will and preferences of
an individual’. In other words, this part of GC1 calls for inclusion, not
for a procedure to be applied only in certain circumstances.
Section three raises the most natural, and common in the literature,
outcome reading of ‘best interpretation’. Called here the ‘epistemic
reading’, this is the idea that the ‘best interpretation’ of a person's will
and preferences is simply whichever interpretation most accurately
reﬂects certain facts about the person. In other words, this reading
assumes that the word ‘best’ in ‘best interpretation’ is synonymous with
the word ‘true’. Section four then compares the epistemic reading to
real processes of interpretation. It ﬁnds the reading wanting, for it oc-
cludes from view the ways that processes of interpretation change a
person, create new preferences, and are themselves an arena for the
person to exercise agency.
Section ﬁve proposes a process reading as an alternative to the
epistemic reading. Its central point is that, when evaluating the ways
that interpretation can change a person, the UNCRPD has not left a
void. It provides a great deal of normative guidance. The reading of
GC1 proposed here is new, but the underlying picture of interpretation
is not, and it may be familiar to psychiatrists in particular. As Jaspers
pointed out, psychiatrists must practice on both sides of a ‘radical dif-
ference’ between ‘scientiﬁc uncommittedness’ and ‘the doctor's parti-
cipation in the fate of his client’: they must ‘surrender to the facts’ yet
be ‘engaged' in a way that will change those facts even as they assess
them (1959/1997: p. 677). This article makes a similar point about
anyone who interprets another person in the hope of enabling them to
exercise their legal rights.
2. Disambiguating ‘the best interpretation of will and preferences’
2.1. Structure of this section
This section performs two main tasks. It shows that the phrase ‘best
interpretation of will and preferences’ is ambiguous: the words ‘best
interpretation’ could refer to either a process of interpretation or to the
outcome of that process. It also shows that, whichever reading is fa-
voured, the scope of ‘best interpretation’ is necessarily wider than is
sometimes asserted.
GC1 states that:
Where, after signiﬁcant eﬀorts have been made, it is not practicable
to determine the will and preferences of an individual, the ‘best
interpretation of will and preferences’ must replace the ‘best inter-
ests’ determinations. This respects the rights, will and preferences of
the individual (para. 21).
This passage contains three relevant ambiguities. Do the words ‘best
interpretation’ apply primarily to a process of interpretation or merely
to its outcome? Similarly, although less importantly, does the word
‘determine’ apply to a process of determination or merely to its out-
come? Finally, what is the role of ‘best interpretation’ when it is
‘practicable to determine’ a person's will and preferences? The next two
subsections address the ﬁrst question, and subsection 2.4 addresses the
ﬁnal question. The ambiguity in the word ‘determine’ is less critical, so
it is addressed here.
GC1 requires ‘best interpretation’ if ‘it is not practicable to de-
termine the will and preferences of an individual’ (para. 21).
‘Determine’ could, like ‘interpretation’, plausibly refer to either a pro-
cess of investigation or to its outcome. In other words, the Comment
could be requiring ‘best interpretation’ either when it is impossible to
begin a process of determining a person's will and preferences or when
such a process has, for some reason, failed.3 For the purposes of this
article, an inclusive deﬁnition can be used. It will be assumed that GC1
requires ‘best interpretation’ both when it is not possible to begin a
process of determining a person's will and preferences and when such a
process has, for whatever reason, failed.
2.2. The process reading of ‘best interpretation’
At this stage, it is necessary to be a little clearer about the diﬀerence
between the process and outcome readings of ‘best interpretation’. It
might be thought that this distinction cannot be maintained and that
the best outcome is only ever reached by the best process. On the level
of interpreting one individual this may be true,4 but that is not the level
on which GC1 operates. Instead, it sets the ‘paradigm’ within which all
such individual interpretations should occur (para. 21). In this context,
is important to settle the question of priority: whether the ‘best out-
come’ is ‘best’ because it is the product of the ‘best process’ or the ‘best
process’ is best because it produces the ‘best outcome’. This is important
because the two possibilities yield entirely diﬀerent systems, as sections
three to ﬁve show. On the process reading, the ‘best interpretation’ is
the one that follows the best process.
The broader context gives the process reading an immediate plau-
sibility. GC1 is intended to provide ‘guidance’ to State Parties (para. 2).
It is concerned with what States should be doing to comply with the
Convention, and any ‘doing’ is a process. The narrower context, how-
ever, presents the process reading with an immediate diﬃculty. How
does one ‘interpret’ a thing that one cannot ‘determine’? For someone to
interpret their dream, they must remember it. For an actor to interpret
the role of Hamlet, they must be familiar with Shakespeare's script.
Interpretation implies familiarity with the thing interpreted. GC1,
however, requires that a person's will and preferences be interpreted
exactly when they cannot be determined; and this problem cuts across
both possible meanings of ‘determine’. Whether ‘it is not practicable to
determine’ is taken to refer to a process of determination that has failed
or to one that could not even be undertaken, the same problem presents
itself. The Comment requires the interpretation of an unknown.
Whether the investigation fails or it cannot even begin, the interpreter
will not know the ‘will and preferences of an individual’ in order to
interpret them.
The process reading of GC1 can be rescued from this problem by
paying attention to the Comment's drafting history. ‘The best inter-
pretation of will and preferences’ was not in the original draft (UN
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2013). It was
introduced in response to a submission made by The Canadian
3 The contextual remark, ‘after signiﬁcant eﬀorts have been made’, does not
settle this ambiguity. ‘Signiﬁcant eﬀorts’ may be either attempts to begin a
process or part of a failed process.
4 Although even at the individual level, this may be because the ‘best’ of ‘best
process’ and ‘best outcome’ circularly redeﬁne one another.
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Association of Community Living (2014). This submission, however,
simply suggests that ‘such a test would recognize that will and pre-
ference cannot always be interpreted with certainty, but that there are
always better interpretations than others’ (2014: p. 5). Unlike GC1, this
does not require the ‘interpretation’ of what cannot be ‘determined'.
Instead, it simply recognizes that interpretation can be diﬃcult, but
aﬃrms that it always possible. If it is assumed that the Committee in-
tended to incorporate this submission into GC1, and did not intend the
incoherence of requiring the interpretation of an unknown, then the
process reading can be preserved. Doing so, however, has two costs.
First, abandoning a hard distinction between ‘determining’ will and
preferences and ‘interpreting’ them signiﬁcantly expands the scope of
‘best interpretation’. This is discussed in subsection 2.4. Second, it re-
quires adding a signiﬁcant gloss to the words of the Comment, and this
should be avoided if possible. If the outcome reading could bypass these
diﬃculties, then this would be a reason to favour it. The next subsection
shows that it cannot.
2.3. The outcome reading of ‘best interpretation’
In the outcome reading of ‘best interpretation’, the phrase does not
refer to a process of interpretation but to the product of such a process.
In other words, on this reading the ‘best interpretation’ is something
like the ‘best understanding’ of the person's will and preferences, not
the process for reaching such an understanding. As the process reading
requires adding a signiﬁcant gloss to the words of GC1, the outcome
reading should be considered; but it, too, faces a diﬃcult question. For
the outcome reading, the diﬃcult question is ‘how is the outcome ar-
rived at?’
A possible answer to this question appears in the academic litera-
ture. Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn (2016: p. 485) recognize that some-
times a decision ‘needs to made’ even when a person's preferences about
that particular decision are ‘unknowable’; but assert that even in these
cases ‘some understanding of an individual's values, views and beliefs’
can be achieved. In other words, when there are diﬃculties inferring a
person's will and preferences about a particular matter, attention
should be paid to their longer-lasting or more general beliefs, values,
and desires. This distinction can be read into GC1 itself by eﬀectively
adding two words:
Where, after signiﬁcant eﬀorts have been made, it is not practicable
to determine the particular will and preferences of an individual, the
“best interpretation of overall will and preferences” must replace the
“best interests” determination (para. 21, as modiﬁed).
In this context, ‘particular’ refers to an unknown will or preference
in question in any given situation, and ‘overall’ refers to the wider array
of all the person's known will and preferences. This rescues GC1 from
the problem, discussed in the previous subsection, of requiring the in-
terpretation of an unknown because it makes the two appearances of
the phrase ‘will and preferences’ refer to diﬀerent things.5 In doing so,
however, it also puts indirect pressure on the apparent dichotomy be-
tween processes of ‘determining’ and ‘interpreting’.
The distinction between ‘particular’ and ‘overall’ will and pre-
ferences puts pressure on the distinction between ‘interpreting’ and
‘determining’ because of how people determine one another's particular
will or preferences in everyday life. They partially do so by reference to
the person's overall will and preferences. Interpreting a person's overall
will and preferences is always, to some extent, required to understand
the person's particular preferences. Take, for instance, the common
English phrase ‘do what whatever you like’. Its meaning is entirely
context-dependent. A boss might say it to indicate that they trust a
subordinate to be self-directed. A patient might say it to indicate that
they do not trust a nurse, but feel coerced. A lover might even say it to
indicate that they want their partner to stop merely doing whatever
they like.6 The particular preference that the phrase discloses is only
revealed by reference to the context, and the speaker's overall will and
preferences are, as in the examples, often the most important part of
that context. There is either a dialogue between interpretation of the
whole and interpretation of the part, or there is simply no interpreta-
tion. As Taylor (1985: p. 18) writes:
We are trying to establish a reading for the whole text, and for this
we appeal to readings of its partial expressions; and yet because we
are dealing with meaning, with making sense, where expressions
only make sense or not in relation to others, the readings of partial
expressions depend on those of others, and ultimately of the whole.
This constant interplay between interpretation of the part and
whole collapses the distinction between ‘determining’ a person's will
and preferences and ‘interpreting’ them in much the same way that
attention to the original submission by the Canadian Association of
Community Living did in subsection 2.2. On examination, it becomes
clear that ‘best interpretation’ is not a special procedure for when
something goes wrong. It is a call to include people with disabilities in
an everyday process, even when this is diﬃcult. In other words, it di-
rects attention to parts of interpretation that can plausibly continue
even when there are severe communication problems. This has two
consequences. First, if GC1's apparent dichotomy between ‘interpreting’
and ‘determining’ breaks down on either a process or outcome reading,
then it does not provide any reason to favour one reading over the
other. Second, as the dichotomy breaks down on both readings, it must
be discarded, and this has consequences for the scope of ‘best inter-
pretation’.
2.4. The scope of ‘the best interpretation of will and preferences’
The previous two subsections show that whether the process or
outcome reading of ‘best interpretation’ is taken, a strict line between
‘determining’ and ‘interpreting’ a person's will and preferences cannot
be maintained. This is directly relevant to another ambiguity in GC1.
The Comment states that ‘where …it is not practicable to determine’
will and preferences, then ‘best interpretation’ applies. This is open to
two readings. It might mean that best interpretation is required only
where it is not practicable to determine will and preferences, or it might
mean that best interpretation is required even where it is not practicable
to determine will and preferences. The former maintains a strict line
between ‘determining’ and ‘interpreting’, and demands a special pro-
cedure for when determining ‘will and preferences’ fails. The latter
collapses that strict line, and demands that everyday practices of ‘in-
terpreting’ continue even when ‘determining’ fails. As there are in-
dependent grounds for believing that a strict line between ‘determining’
and ‘interpreting’ cannot be maintained, the latter reading should
preferred.
There are also contextual reasons for reading GC1 as demanding
‘best interpretation’ even when it is not practicable, rather than only
when it is not practicable, to determine a person's will and preferences.
The Comment introduces standards based on ‘will and preferences’ that
apply to all situations. It states that one characteristic of ‘substitute
decision-making’ regimes, which it requires to be abolished (para. 28),
is that decisions are ‘based on what is believed to be in the objective
“best interests” of the person concerned, as opposed to being based on
the person's own will and preferences’ (para. 27).7 Similarly, GC1
5 This distinction between overall and particular will and preferences can,
however, raise other problems. See Burch (2017).
6 These last two examples also illustrate a danger with any attempts to leg-
islate too closely for ‘correct’ interpretation. The law tends towards literal-
mindedness, but irony is so prevalent and powerful in everyday communication
that it is arguably ‘constitutive of human excellence’ (Lear, 2011: p. 37).
7 This alone is enough to characterise a system as a substituted decision-
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requires that ‘all forms of support in the exercise of legal capacity …
must be based on the will and preference of the person, not on what is
perceived as being in his or her objective best interests’ (para 29(b)).
These passages apply a ‘will and preferences’ standard; but make no
distinction between when will and preferences can and cannot be de-
termined. Furthermore, a reading that requires ‘best interpretation’ only
when will and preferences cannot be determined would draw a legal
line between some people with disabilities and the rest of the popula-
tion on the basis of a distinction that, as already shown, cannot be
sustained. The UNCRPD makes ‘full and eﬀective participation and
inclusion in society’ and ‘respect for diﬀerence and acceptance of per-
sons with disabilities as part of human diversity and humanity’ general
principles for its interpretation (Article 3), so such a step should be
avoided.
Reading the call for ‘best interpretation’ as a call to include people
with disabilities instead of a demand for a special procedure is sig-
niﬁcant for two reasons. First, it massively extends the scope of ‘best
interpretation’. If best interpretation is demanded even where it is not
practicable to determine will and preferences, then it is also demanded
when it is practicable to determine will and preferences. In other words,
if will and preferences are relevant, then ‘best interpretation’ is re-
levant. Due to GC1's ambiguity, this point is not always appreciated. For
instance, Donnelly treats ‘best interpretation’ as the ‘fallback position’
(2016: p. 326). Second, if the demand for ‘best interpretation’ is a call to
include people in everyday processes of interpretation, then close at-
tention to those everyday practices is required. Later sections show that
attention to these practices provides a strong reason to reject the most
popular and natural outcome reading of ‘best interpretation’: the epis-
temic reading.
3. The epistemic reading of ‘best interpretation’
The previous section makes the initial distinction between process
and outcome readings of ‘best interpretation’. Neither reading, how-
ever, is monolithic. In particular, diﬀerent outcome readings are pos-
sible simply because it is possible to characterise diﬀerent types of
outcome as ‘best’. This section introduces the ‘epistemic reading’. This
is the most important outcome reading, both because it is one of the
most natural ways to read GC1 and because it is the most common in
the secondary literature. This claim that it is the most common outcome
reading, however, must be treated with care. The same ambiguity be-
tween process and outcome readings that appears in the Comment is
endemic in the secondary literature. As a consequence, this section
contains examples of authors relying on the epistemic reading, but it is
seldom clear whether or not those authors would consciously endorse it
on reﬂection. To some extent, that issue is irrelevant. Section four
shows that the epistemic reading blocks from view the ways that pro-
cesses of interpretation change a person, create new preferences, and
are themselves an arena for someone to exercise agency. These risks
exist whether or not the person reading ‘best interpretation’ in this way
would reﬂectively endorse it.
The outcome that the epistemic reading treats as ‘best’ is, as its
name suggests, a state of knowledge. In particular, it is a state of
knowledge in the mind of the interpreter. For the purposes of this ar-
ticle, the epistemic reading is any reading that assumes or asserts that
the ‘best’ interpretation is simply whichever interpretation results in the
interpreter having the most accurate understanding of the interpreted
person's will and preferences at the end of the process of interpretation.
Eﬀectively, this reading substitutes the word ‘true’ for the word ‘best’.
This section shows that the epistemic reading is plausibly suggested by
GC1 and common in the secondary literature.
A contextual cue in GC1 makes the epistemic reading plausible. The
Comment repeatedly contrasts ‘will and preferences’ with ‘best inter-
ests’: twice in the paragraph that introduces ‘best interpretation’ (para.
21), and then again in two other paragraphs (paras. 27, 29(b)).
Furthermore, this contrast is reinforced by another. Substitute decision-
making, which is partially deﬁned in terms of ‘best interests’ (para. 27),
is also repeatedly contrasted with respect for ‘will and preferences’
(paras. 17, 26). It easy to generalise these contrasts into a binary in
which a person's ‘will and preferences’ are a fact about them, their ‘best
interests’ are a fact about the world, and there is no necessary con-
nection between the two. If the binary is taken as complete in this way,
then the epistemic reading emerges naturally. If the content of ‘will and
preferences’ is taken to be only facts about the person, then it easy to
assume that ‘the best interpretation of will and preferences’ is simply
the one that discovers those facts as accurately as possible. Although
section ﬁve shows that this reading is not required by GC1, it is easy to
see how it is emerges from it.
The plausibility of the epistemic reading is bolstered by its ap-
pearance in an academic article by Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake that was
inﬂuential on the drafting of GC1.8 Although it does not use the ‘best
interpretation’ terminology, this article argues that even interpretation
that amounts to a supporter trying to ‘imagine what the person's will
and preferences might be’ must be completely distinguished from
‘whether or not the decision is a good one’ (Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake,
2014: pp. 96–97). It might seem strange to attribute the epistemic
reading to an article that talks so frankly about ‘imagining’ a person's
preferences. Nevertheless, due to a distinction discussed in section two,
it is accurate to do so. Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake distinguish between a
person's will or preference about a particular matter and their overall
will and preferences, and they give the latter priority to a startling
degree. For instance, they write that ‘a verbal expression in one instance
may not necessarily represent the true will and preferences of an in-
dividual’ (Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake, 2014: p. 98). This allows them to
admit that a supporter might be ‘imagining’ the particular preference
that is in question, without treating the interpretation of the person's
overall will and preferences as anything other than a matter of dis-
covering the truth about a state of aﬀairs. Indeed, they repeatedly use
the phrase ‘true will and preferences’. An epistemic reading is also im-
plied by other parts of their analysis. For instance, they posit a complete
separation between the person's ‘supreme’ will and preferences and
anybody else's evaluation of ‘the resulting decisions as “good” or “bad”’
(2014: p. 98). This strongly suggests that the ‘best’ process of inter-
preting the person's will and preferences is simply whichever one re-
sults in a true account of certain facts about the individual.
Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake are not the only authors to distinguish
between a person's preferences about a particular matter and their
longer-lasting or more general beliefs and desires. Szmukler uses the
terminology of the UNCRPD itself to distinguish between a person's
currently expressed ‘preferences’ and the ‘will’, which is ‘founded on a
person's deeply held, reasonably stable and reasonably coherent per-
sonal values’ (Szmukler, 2017: p. 94). His epistemic reading is subtle,
and this makes it valuable for illustrating an important distinction.
Szmukler is attentive to the social and normative character of inter-
pretation (2017: pp. 95–96).9 His epistemology is not naïve. He,
(footnote continued)
making regime (UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
2018).
8 This inﬂuence is discussed in Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn (2016: p. 472).
9 Arguably, however, Szmukler is not careful enough with the particular
diﬃculties caused by the normativity of interpretation. For instance, he treats
holding anyone with a belief or value to a normative commitment not to si-
multaneously assert the opposite as unproblematic. This raises two serious
problems. First, the generalisation of the principle of non-contradiction from
beliefs to values and desires is deeply suspect. To say, for instance, ‘I love him,
but I don't love him’, is more than simply intelligible. It describes a mixture of
passion and ambivalence so common that it is a cliché. Second, even in logic,
the place where the principle of non-contradiction might be thought safest, it is
contested (Priest, 2006). As a consequence, Szmukler's claim that non-
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however, treats interpretation as a purely epistemic task. He does not
discuss the ways that processes of interpretation themselves change the
person and their will and preferences. Instead, his entire discussion is of
the interpreter's understanding of the person's mental states. Even the
section on ‘changes in beliefs and values’ is written entirely in this mode
(2017: p. 96). As a consequence, although Szmukler rightly acknowl-
edges that interpretation has an inescapable normative component, he
does not consider the full array of normative standards that any process
of interpretation must be held to.
More sceptical responses to GC1 have also engaged primarily with
the epistemic reading. For instance, Series (2015: p. 88) observes that ‘it
is not immediately obvious that a claim to know a person's true will and
preferences better than they do is a preferable basis for coercive in-
tervention …than mental incapacity and best interests’. Indeed, several
years before GC1 was drafted, Ward (2011: p. 25) warned of the dan-
gers of ‘a decision more truly reﬂective of the views and values of the
supporter, masquerading as the supported decision of the adult’. There
is an obvious conﬂict between this view and that of Flynn and Arstein-
Kerslake. They treat the determination of a person's preferences as the
only process that can confer legitimacy on an action done in that per-
son's name, but Ward treats the same process as inherently dangerous.
Behind the surface conﬂict, however, there is a deeper agreement. The
epistemic reading frames the entire debate. It is assumed that either a
person's preferences, existing separate to the process of interpretation,
can be known, in which case interpretation is legitimate; or they cannot
be known, possibly because they do not exist, in which case inter-
pretation is not legitimate. The more sceptical authors sometimes make
this framing explicit. For instance, Donnelly says ‘the best interpreta-
tion standard refuses to acknowledge that there are things that we do
not, and cannot, know. It forgoes epistemic humility and assumes levels
of knowledge (and justiﬁcations for actions) in situations where they do
not exist’ (2016: p. 327). As a critique of the epistemic reading, her
point has considerable force. If, however, the ‘best’ of ‘best interpreta-
tion’ is not reduced to ‘true’ alone, these criticisms may miss their mark.
4. Everyday interpretation
4.1. The role interpretive presumptions
Subsection 2.3 concluded that the demand for ‘best interpretation’ is
a call to include people with disabilities in everyday interpretative
practices, not a demand for a special procedure to be developed only for
when will and preferences cannot be determined. If this is so, then it is
necessary to pay attention to the implications that everyday inter-
pretative practices have for supporting a person's legal capacity. This
section shows that these practices present a serious challenge to the
epistemic reading. Everyday interpretative acts change the interpreted
person and their will and preferences; and do so in both acceptable
ways, which create new opportunities for the person, and unacceptable
ones, which constrain the person. As the epistemic reading only eval-
uates the state of knowledge that an interpreter has at the end of a
process of interpretation, it is incapable of distinguishing between these
good and bad eﬀects of interpretative acts. This subsection draws at-
tention to a pervasive and important feature of everyday interpretation:
the use of presumptions. The next subsection shows the challenge that
this practice presents to the epistemic reading, and the ﬁnal subsection
addresses a possible objection to this analysis.
The UNCRPD literature to date almost universally contains ex-
amples of people with relatively severe disabilities being interpreted by
professionals who are tacitly assumed to have no such disabilities.
There is a place for such examples; but if treated as the entire ﬁeld, then
they are dangerous. They focus too much attention on the, real or
imagined, ways that interpreting people with certain disabilities is
diﬀerent to ‘normal’ without ﬁrst providing any account of how
‘normal’ interpretation operates. It is necessary to go slower. For this
reason, the following example of an act of interpretation does not
mention disabilities, although the participants may have almost any
disability or none. In this example, Steve and Janet are shopping. Steve
says ‘I want to go home’. To understand the words, Janet will make a
number of interpretative presumptions. For instance, she will probably
presume that Steve is using the words as people usually do, that he is
referring to their current situation, and that he desires his preference go
home to guide their behaviour.10
The literature on will and preferences often mentions presumptions,
but it treats them as something to be used as a last resort for when the
determination of will and preferences fails (Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake
2014: p. 98; Gooding, 2015: p. 55; Donnelly, 2016: p. 326)). This is a
consequence of focussing on diﬃcult examples without ﬁrst having a
clear account of the everyday interpretative practices that provide the
wider context. This ‘last resort’ usage might be one function of pre-
sumptions, but it is a relatively marginal one. As the example shows,
presumptions are not only present when interpretation ‘fails’. They are
necessary for interpretation to occur in the ﬁrst place. This alone ren-
ders them worthy of closer attention.
The form of presumptions can be summarised as follows: ‘in con-
ditions C, take P to be true, unless D' (adapted from Resher, 2006: p.
33).11 This is best analysed from the outside in, examining C and D
before P. The conditions (C) in which interpretative presumptions apply
can be extremely broad. For instance, the presumption that someone
understands a word that they use applies to almost all spoken com-
munication, although it is sometimes rebutted. This latter point, pre-
sumptions can be rebutted, is intrinsic to their form. This is the meaning
of ‘unless D'. D, however, does not refer merely to contradictory evi-
dence. It refers to contradictory evidence on interpretation; and that
secondary interpretation, too, will rely on presumptions.
In the example, Janet might respond to Steve saying that he wants
to go home by replying ‘but we just got here’, and Steve might then say
‘I don't mean the house. I mean I'm tired of London. I want to go back to
Scotland'. If so, Janet's presumption that he was referring to their im-
mediate situation will be rebutted. It is only rebutted, however, if she
presumes, among other things, that a later clariﬁcation should have
priority over the original statement it clariﬁes. This new presumption
could, itself, be rebutted if, for instance, Janet was visibly hurt by
Steve's initial statement. Then, especially if Steve looks ﬂustered, an
observer might suspect that Steve really does want to go back to the
house and that his comment about Scotland is just a panicked attempt
to cover this up. Rebutting a presumption does not reduce the number
of presumptions operating within a process of interpretation. It in-
creases it, by drawing on other presumptions. Interpretative presump-
tions are utterly pervasive in every act of interpretation. This is im-
portant because, as the next subsection shows, their operation is not
compatible with the epistemic reading.
4.2. Interpretation changes a person and their will and preferences
In the example, Steve's act of clariﬁcation – ‘I don't mean the house.
I mean I'm tired of London…’ – highlights an important detail. A per-
son's will and preferences are not inert objects. They contribute to their
(footnote continued)
contradiction is a universal value that ‘cuts across cultures’ is far too strong, but
any weaker form of it fails to serve his purposes: if it only matters sometimes,
then what norms govern its use?
10 There is no need for someone making a presumption to consciously think of
it in every case. As Anscombe (2000: §42) writes, there is a diﬀerence between
‘an order which is there whenever actions are done with intentions’ and ‘actual
mental processes’.
11 This form excludes so called ‘irrefutable presumptions’, which are better
described as ‘stipulations’ (Rescher. 2006: p. 5).
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own interpretation. Steve's desire to return to Scotland motivated him
to clarify when he was misinterpreted. Conversely, other preferences,
particularly those that the person feels shame about, might hinder their
own interpretation. If, however, a person, and their will and pre-
ferences, might be active during interpretative acts, then this puts
pressure on the epistemic reading. If interpretative acts provide op-
portunities for the interpreted person to express preferences, then these
expressive opportunities may have a value that will not be captured by
any view that assesses only the interpreter's state of knowledge. For
example, Steve may feel a sense of relief at getting a worry oﬀ his chest.
An interpretative act that allows him to do so may be preferable to one
that does not, regardless of its eﬀect on the interpreter's state of
knowledge.
The problems for the epistemic reading are, however, far more se-
vere than this. Interpretative acts do not just create opportunities for
the person to express themselves. They can also change a person's will
and preferences. A person's will and preferences change in response to
their environment; and, because humans are extremely social creatures,
they particularly change in response to interpretation by others. This
self-interpreting, responsive aspect of preferences is fatal to the epis-
temic reading. If interpretation sometimes changes the person's pre-
ferences, then it is important to evaluate how it does so; but the epis-
temic reading only evaluates the interpreter's state of knowledge at the
end of the process. This is not a situation that only applies to a parti-
cular class of people in need of extra support. It is a feature of everyday
life. Imagine the following unremarkable exchange:
Zhuangzi: ‘What do you want to eat?’
Huizi: ‘I'm not sure’.
Zhuangzi: ‘We haven't had ﬁsh for a long time’.
Huizi: ‘Oh yes, ﬁsh. Perfect’.
Huizi wanted to eat something before this exchange, and he wanted
to eat ﬁsh after it. The process of interpretation changed his desire. It
may be tempting to attempt to avoid this conclusion by imagining that
Huizi already had an unconscious desire for ﬁsh. Then he always
wanted ﬁsh, and Zhuangzi, by artful interpretation, led him not only to
expressing his preference but also to greater self-knowledge. Fantastical
stories of this kind are not innocent. They obscure the agency of the
person that they are told about. Huizi's development of a preference for
ﬁsh is his active response to his environment; but if the desire is written
back in time, this is lost. He is, instead, pictured as an unresponsive
lump from which Zhuangzi excavates an already-existing preference.
Applied to mental disability law, such stories subtly misattribute the
person's agency to their supporter. The tale becomes one of an active
supporter expertly obtaining a preference from supposedly inactive
person with disabilities. This would not accord with the general prin-
ciples of the UNCRPD. In particular it does not show ‘respect for in-
herent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make
one's own choices, and independence of persons’ (Article 3(a)).
Huizi's sudden desire for ﬁsh is probably better categorised as a
‘preference’ than his ‘will’. Even if, however, a person's ‘will’ is char-
acterised as their deeper, more stable, desires and values (Arstein-
Kerslake and Flynn, 2016: p. 13; Szmukler, 2017: p. 94), then an ana-
logous point will hold. Like preferences, these more durable features of
person start somewhere. No one is born knowing that they wish to
pursue a career as an architect or consciously endorsing the particular
doctrines of any religion. Often, perhaps even more often than for mere
preferences, such life projects emerge in the space where self-inter-
pretation and interpretation by others interact. This support is the stuﬀ
of everyday life: the encouraging teacher who helps a pupil to see that
they have options self-doubt had stopped them from considering; the
child on holiday whose trust for the young adult supervising the pool
causes them to consider parenthood for the ﬁrst time12; or the person
who sits up all night with their friend who is considering divorce,
talking over the options.
This last example, friends discussing whether one should divorce,
also illustrates the ways that stories are told that project the will back in
time before its historical point of origin, as memories are rewritten to
‘preserve a coherent self-image’ (Bortolotti, 2015: p. 136). If the person
decides to divorce, then later they might say ‘it was what I wanted, I
just didn't know that I wanted it’ about the time immediately before the
discussion with their friend. This might capture the way the ﬁnal de-
cision reﬂects long-standing and deeply-held commitments; but if the
person began the conversation in genuine doubt and ended it genuinely
resolved on a course of action, it also obscures what has changed. Even
if the decision to divorce does reﬂect a long-standing commitment to
demanding a certain level of behaviour from a partner, it also marks the
end of a long-standing commitment to that particular relationship. In
other words, a new will is formed in these situations: a will that the
conﬂicts between other long-standing commitments should be resolved
by acting in a particular way.13 The person's will emerges from the
shared process of interpretation and self-interpretation. Acts of inter-
pretation do not merely assess another person's will. Sometimes, they
change it.
If it is admitted that processes of interpretation can change will and
preferences, then the epistemic reading must be abandoned. There are
both good and bad ways of inﬂuencing another person's will and pre-
ferences; but a reading that evaluates only the interpreter's state of
knowledge cannot evaluate their inﬂuence on the person. Domestic or
institutional abuse provides the clearest example of this point. When
someone shows a certain amount of independence, then a controlling or
abusive carer might always ask ‘are you really sure that you want to do
that?’ They will not ask this question when the person acts in ways that
heighten their dependence on the carer. In the right conditions, espe-
cially if the person is heavily dependent for a long period of time, this
pattern of questioning may be enough for self-doubt to undermine
someone's will to be independent (adapted from Benson, 1994). Indeed,
if they are dependent on the supporter from a young age, they may
never develop a will for independence in the ﬁrst place.14 Yet all the
carer has done is ask an interpretative question, and it is one that
probably will allow them to better understand the person's preferences.
They might conclude that the person does not wish to be independent,
and that conclusion might be true. It might accurately reﬂect the per-
son's will and preferences. On the epistemic reading it is therefore an
act of ‘best interpretation’.
A similar point applies to good interpretative support: the epistemic
reading cannot always capture what is good about it. Imagine an in-
terpreter who is careful to obtain the interpreted person's opinion on all
the available options in whatever situation it is that they face. Doing so
is clearly an act of interpreting the person's will and preferences; but
quite often the person will be unaware of an option before the inter-
preter seeks their opinion on it. The epistemic reading, however, cannot
distinguish between an interpreter who presents the person with new
options and one who does not bother. Both will have a ‘true’ inter-
pretation of the person's will and preferences. The diﬀerence between
the two is that the interpreter who explored all the options has given
the person an opportunity to change their will and preferences.
12Note how little expertise an interpreter needs to begin a process that
(footnote continued)
changes someone's will. Children do it.
13 In terms of Frankfurt's (1971: p. 10) inﬂuential paper, the person may have
begun the conversation with a desire to divorce or even a second-order desire to
want to divorce, but they ended it with a second-order volition to divorce: a
desire for the desire to divorce to eﬀectively guide their actions.
14 This is an issue that sometimes arises in the Court of Protection of England
and Wales. For instance: A Local Authority v M [2014] EWCOP 33, [2015]
COPLR 6 [230].
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4.3. Everyday interpretation in the hard cases
The problems with the epistemic reading raised in ﬁrst two parts of
this section might be dismissed as an artefact of looking at everyday
interpretation. It might be though that if communication is particularly
diﬃcult, then the person will be less able to express their agency during
interpretation and will be less likely to change their will and pre-
ferences, so the problems with the epistemic reading will be marginal.
This subsection gives a number of reasons for resisting this conclusion.
The ﬁrst reason to reject the epistemic reading even when com-
munication is diﬃcult is that, as shown in subsection 2.3, GC1 is a call
to include people facing serious communication diﬃculties in everyday
practices, not a call to develop a special process just for them. If ex-
pressing agency and changing preferences are important parts of in-
terpretative practices in daily life, then the aim should be to make them
available even to those who have serious problems with communica-
tion. In some cases the attempt might fail, but that does not justify not
making it.
Second, rather than supporting the epistemic reading, communica-
tion diﬃculties undermine it. Severe communication diﬃculties make
people less able to rebut incorrect presumptions, so interpretation in
these circumstances will be less accurate. It makes little sense to reduce
‘best interpretation’ to ‘true interpretation’ only in the cases where it is
least likely to be true. Beyond this, limiting the epistemic reading to
cases of severe communication diﬃculties creates a contradiction. It
simultaneously asserts (A) that interpretative process do not change the
preferences of people with severe communication diﬃculties and (B)
that their preferences cannot known due to the communication pro-
blems. If, however, their preferences cannot be known, then the claim
that they have not changed cannot be evidenced.
The ﬁnal reason to avoid the epistemic reading is due to the parti-
cular form of reasoning that is often recommended in cases of serious
communication problems. It typically takes the form: ‘P cannot com-
municate a preference to us; but if they could communicate, then they
would express a preference for X' (Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake, 2014:
pp. 84–85; Gooding, 2015: p. 55). This is what is known as a coun-
terfactual claim: the ﬁrst clause, ‘P cannot communicate’ denies that
something is true; and the rest of the sentence states what would have
been the case if it had been true.15 There is an obvious contradiction
between this form and the epistemic reading, which assumes that all
that matters to an interpretation is that it is true. Counterfactuals are
explicitly about things that are not true. Furthermore, counterfactual
reasoning turns on the idea that some alternative world is more similar
to the real world than other alternative worlds, and this central concept
of ‘similarity’ is entirely context-speciﬁc (Lewis, 1986: pp. 251–252). It
requires ideas about what is important, not only ideas about what is
true. The processes suggested for the most diﬃcult cases of inter-
pretation are no more compatible with the epistemic reading than other
interpretative processes are.
5. The substantive reading of ‘best interpretation’
5.1. Using the UNCRPD and GC1 to develop a process reading
This section suggests an alternative to the epistemic reading of ‘best
interpretation’. On this alternate reading, the accuracy of the ﬁnal in-
terpretation is an important norm that interpretation should be eval-
uated against, but it is not the only one. The substance of interpretation
must also be evaluated: how it operates, what presumptions it relies on,
and what eﬀects it has on the person. It must be evaluated against the
full array of rights in the UNCRPD. This subsection shows that it is
possible to read GC1 in this way, and the next one addresses three
problems that this substantive reading may face in practice. The aim of
this section of a whole, however, is merely to show that the substantive
reading is plausible, not to develop all of its details.
The substantive reading is possible because the contextual cues in
GC1 that have suggest the epistemic reading are ambiguous. The binary
between ‘best interests’ and ‘will and preferences’ is largely qualiﬁed. It
occurs at the level of ‘paradigms’, ‘regimes’, ‘systems’, and ‘primacy’
(paras. 21, 26–29); and this falls short of what the epistemic reading
requires. A contrast between, for example, a ‘best interests paradigm’
and a ‘will and preferences paradigm’ does not necessarily imply that a
supporter attempting to determine someone's preferences cannot draw
on ideas about what might be good for them at all. Nor does it imply
that a supporter cannot encourage the person to change their pre-
ferences at all. It merely implies that the overall goal of the process is to
attend to the person's will and preferences rather than whatever is
believed to be their objective good. To put it another way, in GC1
consideration of the person's good can inﬂuence the process of inter-
pretation, but it cannot dictate the outcome of that interpretation. For
example, the thought that all people need food to survive can cause an
interpreter to raise the issue with and challenge a particular person who
is not eating. What GC1 would not allow is allowing this objective good
to justify ignoring the person's apparent preference or, because it
amounts to the same thing, simply concluding that the person ‘really’
wants to eat, no matter what they say and do.
There are only a few places where GC1 directly addresses particular
acts of interpretation. Indeed, only three statements can be char-
acterised in this way: it states that ‘the “best interpretation of will and
preferences” must replace the “best interests” determinations’ (para.
21); it deﬁnes substituted decision-making regimes as including those
in which ‘any decision made by a substitute decision-maker is based on
what is believed to be in the objective “best interests” of the person
concerned, as opposed to being based on the person's own will and
preferences’ (para. 27); and it states that ‘all forms of support in the
exercise of legal capacity …must be based on the will and preference of
the person, not on what is perceived as being in his or her objective best
interests’ (para. 29(b)). These statements address individual decisions
and contain a binary between determining the person's will and pre-
ferences and their best interests. Even these statements, however, do
not require the epistemic reading. None of them forbids an interpreter
from respectfully inﬂuencing a person's preferences as part of the pro-
cess of ‘best interpretation’.16
It is not, however, enough to simply reject the epistemic reading. If
truthfulness is important to interpretation, but so are the ways that
interpretation can provide an avenue for self-expression and changes in
will and preferences, then it is important to have some idea about the
norms that distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable inﬂuences
on the person. The Comment itself can be read as suggesting substantive
norms to guide interpretation, and doing so also makes some of its more
puzzling passages clearer. In particular, it states that ‘the best inter-
pretation of will and preferences … respects the rights, will and pre-
ferences of the individual’ (para. 21). How does interpreting only will
and preferences also automatically respect rights? If best interpretation
is reduced to true interpretation, this oﬀers a dilemma. It requires be-
lieving either that conﬂicts between rights and ‘will and preferences’
are impossible, despite such situations being a regular feature of both
everyday life and the secondary literature (Richardson, 2013: p. 100;
Gooding, 2015: p. 61; Szmukler, 2017: p. 94), or believing that pre-
ferences, no matter how ﬂeeting or mistaken, must always trump rights,
15 As Lewis (1973: p. 3) points out, without the ﬁrst clause, ‘if they could
communicate’ would imply that they cannot communicate as a matter of typical
English usage, but it would not necessarily do so as a matter of logic.
16 Beyond this, indirect evidence that GC1 does not treat ‘best interests’ and
‘will and preferences’ as entirely irreconcilable opposites emerges in its dis-
cussion of children with disabilities. As the UNCRPD requires, it allows best
interests to be the primary consideration if the child's will and preferences are
also ‘respected on an equal basis with other children’ (para 36).
P. Skowron ,QWHUQDWLRQDO-RXUQDORI/DZDQG3V\FKLDWU\²

no matter how important, despite the implausibility of that position.17
A substantive reading, one that does not reduce ‘best interpretation’
to ‘true interpretation’, avoids these problems. It simply reads the other
rights found in the UNCRPD into the word ‘best’. In other words, ‘the
best interpretation of will and preferences’ respects ‘rights’ because if
the interpretation does not respect the person's rights, then it is not the
best interpretation. To use an extreme example, it is possible to obtain a
‘true interpretation’ of a person's preferences by abusing them until they
prefer whatever the abuser wants. On a substantive reading of GC1, this
is not the ‘best interpretation’ for the simple reason that it breaches
Article 16 of the UNCRPD. To give a positive example, on the sub-
stantive reading, it is permissible for an interpreter to presume that the
person that they are interpreting wishes to have opportunities to take
up paid employment on an equal basis as others (Article 27) if, and only
if, they attempt to give that person an opportunity to rebut the pre-
sumption. On this reading, the UNCRPD itself provides a series of
starting points for interpretation, although it is necessary to test those
starting points by engaging the person.
This reading can be supported by reference to other parts of GC1. It
states that ‘a supported decision-making regime comprises various
support options which give primacy to a person's will and preferences
and respect human rights norms’ (para. 29). This is not a claim that
respect for will and preferences must trump respect for ‘human rights
norms’. It is a call to respect both at the same time. Indeed, the
Comment expressly relies on particular norms found in the Convention
when discussing ‘support in the exercise of legal capacity’, which is
described as being ‘based on the will and preference of the person’
(para. 29(b)). For instance, it requires ‘protection against undue inﬂu-
ence’ and understands ‘undue inﬂuence’ to include cases in which the
person is deceived (para. 22, drawing on Article 12(4)). This, however,
suggests that interpretation is not simply a matter of accurately de-
termining the person's will and preferences. If those preferences are the
result of deception, it will also require the creation of opportunities to
change them. Similarly, the Comment requires the provision of in-
formation in an accessible manner (para. 17, drawing on Article 12(3)).
This is not a matter of discovering what the person prefers as accurately
as possible. It is a matter of assisting the person to form the best pre-
ferences that they can.18 These provisions cannot be accounted for by
the epistemic reading. From the substantive reading they are making
relatively obvious points.
5.2. Practical diﬃculties for the substantive reading
Although this article merely shows that the substantive reading is
plausible, rather than addressing all potential problems with it, three
related issues should be addressed at his point: conﬂicts between dif-
ferent rights; conﬂicts between a person's rights and an expression of
their will and preferences; and conﬂicts within the person's will and
preferences. An example of the former, conﬂicts between rights, is a
person who both wishes to leave an institutional setting in order to live
in the community (Article 19) and wishes to maintain their health and
‘physical and mental integrity’ (Articles 17 and 25), when there are
good reasons to think that away from the institution they will neglect to
take medications and their physical health will deteriorate. The person
expresses a preference for both independence and health, and both are
rights, so the substantive reading does not seem to oﬀer a solution. Nor
should it, if ‘solution’ is taken to mean a single answer appropriate for
all cases. Sometimes rights really do conﬂict. Diﬃcult moral dilemmas
are an inescapable part of human life, and the UNCRPD aims to include
people with disabilities in humanity's shared diﬃculties, not to
somehow save them from the inconvenience (Preamble (a), (c), (e), (g),
(k), (m), (o); Articles 3, 9, 19, 26, 27, 29, 30). The substantive reading,
however, requires attention to conﬂicting rights during the interpreta-
tion of the person's will and preferences, and that attention may suggest
new avenues that will resolve the conﬂict for that particular person. In
the example, the person may agree to a daily visitor who reminds them
to take their medication.19 Pragmatic solutions like this are not new,
but they resolve a particular instance of conﬂicting rights. The sub-
stantive reading admits that no single ideal, such as freedom, can guide
practice. Instead it responds to ‘a whole plantation of such ideals which
will all need to be balanced against one another’ (Midgley 2017: p. viii).
The second issue, a person's expression of their will and preferences
conﬂicting with one of their rights, more directly implicates the sub-
stantive reading. To put the core issue in its bluntest form, does the
substantive reading ever allow a person's expression of will and pre-
ferences to be disregarded in favour of the protection of one of their
rights? The answer follows from a series of points made earlier in this
article. On the substantive reading, ‘best interpretation’ is a process, not
merely the outcome of that process. This process of interpretation, as
shown in section 4, must start with some interpretative presumptions,
and should provide the interpreted person with opportunities to express
their agency and change their will and preferences. The substantive
reading makes all of the rights found in the UNCRPD into interpretative
presumptions; but another common and important interpretative pre-
sumption is that people generally mean what they say. This class of
cases are therefore reducible to a clash of interpretative presumptions.
When the person ﬁrst expresses a preference that may conﬂict with one
of their rights, however, this conﬂict of presumptions has not yet been
resolved. Nor has the process of best interpretation, which should allow
them to change their views, occurred. From these points, an approach
to conﬂicts between rights and expressed will and preferences follows.
The substantive reading allows the person's rights to be favoured over
their currently expressed preferences if, and only if, one of two condi-
tions exists: (A) there are realistic grounds to believe that a non-coer-
cive (GC1 paras. 22, 27(ii)) process of interpretation and support might
change the person's will and preferences; or (B) there is genuine doubt
about how to interpret the expression of will and preferences. An ex-
ample may make the approach clearer.
Iris has recurrent depressive disorder with psychotic symptoms
during some episodes. When she is depressed, she sometimes ex-
periences delusions, such as the belief that people attempting to help
her must have ulterior motives because she is ‘no good'. She has
attempted suicide during previous episodes, but for the last few
years she has managed her condition with medication and by self-
referring to services when she feels that she is ‘spiralling’ into de-
pression. On this occasion, however, contact with services is initially
17 Even Mill (1859/2003: p. 158) thought that someone's right to life would
have priority over their preference to cross a bridge that they did not know was
unsafe. He, admittedly, claims that the basis for intervention is the person's
desire to live. This justiﬁcation is, however, of entirely the wrong form. It as-
sumes that eﬀect is being given to a single unitary desire, to live; but, on his
own telling, the example contains a conﬂict between two desires, to live and to
cross the bridge. The person crossing the bridge does not desire to resolve the
conﬂict in this particular way because, again on Mill's own telling, they are
unaware of the conﬂict. Basing a decision on the idea that the person would
resolve the conﬂict in any particular way, if only they had more information, is
to privilege an imaginary alternative person over the existing one. This ne-
cessarily draws on norms other than truth and so abandons the epistemic view:
see the discussion of counterfactuals at the end of the previous section and
Harmon (1990).
18 A similar point applies to the requirement for medical treatment to be
based on informed consent (2014: paras. 41–42, drawing on Articles 14–17 and
25).
19 If this support is not available, then the State may be in breach of the
Articles in question (here, 17 and 25) read in conjunction with Article 5, which
requires ‘appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is pro-
vided’. For conceptual clarity, it is necessary to address this issue before the
question of ‘best interpretation’. If the support is not required by the
Convention, then failing to provide it does not cause a conﬂict of rights.
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made by her brother. He reports that Iris is ‘very poorly’, stopped
taking her medication about a week ago, and has said things that
indicate that she is seriously considering suicide. When the com-
munity crisis team visit Iris, she expresses a wish to die and refuses
all assistance, saying to the nurses that they are ‘only worried about
their own jobs'.
This example contains a conﬂict between Iris's expressed preference
and her right to life (Article 10). It is important to note, however, that
on the substantive reading it does not yet contain a conﬂict between the
best interpretation of her will and preferences and her right to life. The
presumption that a person means what they say counts in favour of
taking her expressed wish to die at face value. At the same time,
however, the presumption that generally people wish to live and Iris's
history of sometimes wishing to die but generally acting to overcome
that wish both count in favour treating any presumption that her ex-
pressed wish articulates all of her ‘will and preferences’ with great
caution. Furthermore, based on her history, there are realistic grounds
to think that with support she may change preferences. After all, she has
done so before. Although this example is just an outline and the sub-
stantive reading is necessarily responsive to small changes in the facts,
it would in this case require seeking to persuade Iris to engage with
support and ultimately change her mind. It would not justify simply
allowing her expressed wish to die to override all other concerns.
Iris's suspicion of professionals raises another question. If she refuses
to engage with the processes of best interpretation and if her threat to
her own life is imminent, then might it be permissible to coerce her? If
the underlying legal basis for coercion also applies when those without
disabilities appear to be presenting an imminent and serious threat to
themselves,20 then a substantive reading will permit coercion in var-
iations of the same two conditions as it permits favouring the person's
rights over their expressed wishes: (A) there are realistic grounds to
believe that after the initial coercion, the person will engage in a non-
coercive process of interpretation and support and that this process
might change the person's will and preferences; or (B) there is genuine
doubt about how to interpret the expression of will and preferences,
and after the coercion it will realistically be possible to resolve this
doubt.21 If there is no doubt about the person's will and preferences and
no realistic prospect of the person subsequently engaging in non-coer-
cive processes that may change their will and preferences, then on the
substantive reading there is no basis for coercion.
It is necessary to distinguish conﬂicts between a person's expressed
will and preferences and their rights from conﬂicts within their will and
preferences. Any account of interpretation should allow for the possi-
bility of the latter. It is important to allow the ‘best interpretation’ of a
person to recognize that they may be, as we all sometimes are, ‘un-
ﬁnished and fragmented' (Jaspers 1997: p. 760). This possibility is,
however, foreclosed in some recent accounts of interpretation. For in-
stance, it is thought that a particular act of interpretation might be
justiﬁed by reference to what the person ‘authentically’ wants
(Szmukler and Bach, 2015: p. 7), their ‘will’ as opposed to their ‘pre-
ferences' (Szmukler, 2017: p. 94), the person's ‘narrative’ (Bach and
Kerzner, 2010: pp. 63–67), or their ‘values' (for a critical account, see
Banner, 2013: pp. 75–78). All such accounts posit a higher, uniﬁed self
– the authentic self, the self that has a coherent narrative, or the self
with integrated central values – that transcends the messy and
contradictory empirical human being. These theories face fundamental
problems with both in theory (Garnett, 2017) and in application to
decision-making law (Burch, 2017); and, as Midgley observes, when
they are mistaken for the whole of morality, they quickly become ‘in-
coherent’ (1991/2017: p. 104). In the current context, however, the
particular danger of these theories is that they treat two morally dif-
ferent situations in an identical manner; and, although in one of these
situations they are harmless, in the other they are misleading. Two
examples will make this point clearer.
The harmless use of these theories is when the process of inter-
pretation allows the person to resolve a conﬂict in their will and pre-
ferences. For example, imagine Kirsty knows that when she drinks, she
‘loses control’ and consequences follow that she prefers to avoid; but
she also wants to go for a beer with old friends. If, with a supporter, she
reaches the conclusion that even one beer is not worth the risk, then
there is no harm in saying that she ‘authentically’ wants to avoid
drinking on this occasion. Such cases should be distinguished from ones
in which it is the interpreter, not the person, who resolves a conﬂict
between diﬀerent preferences. Consider the following example:
Gary has a severe learning disability and, following a traumatic
childhood experience, is terriﬁed of hospitals and doctors. Gary
enjoys his life, and any process of interpretation would conclude
that he wants to live; but he has contracted a chest infection that the
community nurse strongly suspects has developed into pneumonia.
The only way to get a chest X-ray is in the local hospital; and the
likely treatment, high-ﬂow oxygen therapy and intravenous anti-
biotics, can only be administered in hospital.
In these circumstances, even with all practicable supports, Gary
might not be able to resolve a conﬂict between his will to live and his
will to avoid hospitals. His fear might stop him from being able to
consider hospitals at all, and his learning disability may prevent him
from abstractly reﬂecting on his own fear. For practical reasons, an
interpreter may have to choose one will or another; but, if so, they must
be clear that it is them, not Gary, who is doing so. It is in cases like this
that ideas of ‘authenticity’ and ‘narrative’ are dangerous. Kierkegaard
(1843/2008: JJ:167), characteristically, sums up the underlying point
in an aphorism: ‘it is quite true what philosophy says, that life must be
understood backward. But then one forgets the other principle, that it
must be lived forward’. The past and the future are not, for living
creatures, symmetrical; and appealing only to a person's ‘narrative’ does
not help when the question is what their narrative should be. As Lippitt
(2007: p. 58) writes, pretending otherwise risks ‘over-simplifying what
a human life is like’. When it comes to ‘best interpretation’ to claim that
the interpreter's resolution of a conﬂict somehow embodies the person's
values, authenticity, or narrative is to favour an imaginary uniﬁed self,
‘an empty puppet’ (Harmon 1990: p. 69), over the empirical conﬂicted
person. Instead, the substantive reading should require an interpreter to
openly admit that is they who are reaching a ﬁnal conclusion based on
what they know of the person's conﬂicted will and preferences and the
rights found in the UNCRPD.
6. Conclusion
This article makes two central points. First, the epistemic reading of
‘best interpretation of will and preferences’, one which reduces the
word ‘best’ to the word ‘true’, should be avoided. Interpretative acts are
complex, and can change a person's will and preferences in ways that
can be either good or bad. Some way of evaluating these diverse eﬀects,
which the epistemic reading cannot provide, is needed. Second, the
problem with the epistemic reading is not necessarily a problem with
GC1. The substantive reading, guided by the rights found in the
UNCRPD, is consistent with the Comment and avoids the problems that
the epistemic reading faces. Although the purpose of this article has
been to give a particular account of best interpretation rather than to
compare it to the best interests standard, it may have implications for
20 See Articles 12(2), 14, 15, and 25(d).
21 Flynn and Arstein-Kerslake (2014: p. 98–99; 2017) appear to recognize the
second, but not the ﬁrst, of these conditions–. This passage merely addresses the
acceptability of coercion from the perspective of the substantive reading. For a
variety of reasons, it is not a recommendation for a legislative programme:
other parts of the UNCRPD apply further constraints to the use of coercion;
analysis of best interpretation does not provide guidance on the procedural
checks that are necessary on any coercive power; and analysis of best inter-
pretation does not address all of the relevant moral or political issues.
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that wider debate. In particular, it suggests that any attempt to compare
the two should ﬁrst be clear about which reading of ‘best interpretation’
is being used and why.
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